Introduction {#Sec1}
============

Self-interest often leads to freeloading on the contributions of others in the dynamics associated with common goods and joint enterprises \[[@CR22], [@CR41]\]. As is well known, incentivization, such as rewarding and punishing, is a popular method for harnessing the selfish action and for motivating individuals to behave cooperatively \[[@CR5], [@CR7], [@CR8], [@CR15], [@CR17], [@CR38], [@CR39], [@CR45], [@CR47], [@CR53], [@CR54]\]. Experimental and theoretical studies on joint enterprises under various incentive schemes are growing \[[@CR3], [@CR20], [@CR21], [@CR28], [@CR37], [@CR50], [@CR51], [@CR59], [@CR60]\].

Obviously, whether rewards or penalties, sufficiently large incentives can transform freeloaders into full cooperators, and incentives with small impact do nothing on the outcomes \[[@CR50]\]. However, incentivizing is costly, and such heavy incentives often incur serious costs on those who provide the incentives, whether in a peer-to-peer or institutional manner. Previous game-theoretic studies on the evolution of cooperation with incentives have focused on public good games with compulsory participation, and revealed that the intermediate degrees of punishment lead to a couple of stable equilibria, full defection and full cooperation \[[@CR7], [@CR8], [@CR42], [@CR47], [@CR50], [@CR54]\]. In this bi-stable dynamics, establishing full cooperation requires an initially sufficient fraction of cooperators, or ex ante adjustment to overcome the initial condition \[[@CR8], [@CR42]\]. This situation is a coordination game \[[@CR57]\], which is a model of great interest for analyzing a widespread coordination problem (e.g., in choosing distinct technical standards).

In contrast to a traditional case with compulsory participation, another approach to the evolution of cooperation is an option to opt out of joint enterprises \[[@CR1], [@CR6], [@CR10], [@CR18], [@CR24], [@CR25], [@CR32], [@CR35], [@CR40], [@CR49], [@CR52], [@CR62], [@CR65]\]. The opting-out option can make the freeloader problem relaxed: individuals can exit a joint venture when stuck in a state in which all freeload off one another ("economic stalemate"), and then pursue a stand-alone project; if a joint venture with mutual cooperation is more profitable than in isolation, the individuals once exited will switch to contributing to the venture. This situation, however, will also find defection attractive. Thus, joint enterprises with optional participation can give rise to a rock-paper-scissors cycle \[[@CR24], [@CR25], [@CR35], [@CR52]\].

Recently, Sasaki et al. \[[@CR50]\] revealed that considering optional participation as well as institutional incentives can effect fully cooperative outcomes for the intermediate ranges of incentives. They demonstrated that opting-out combined with rewarding is not very effective at establishing full cooperation, but opting-out combined with punishment is very effective at establishing cooperation. Although there are a series of existing papers on the interplay of punishment and opting-out mechanisms \[[@CR9], [@CR13], [@CR16], [@CR26], [@CR55], [@CR56], [@CR61]\], the main points of these earlier studies comprise solving the puzzling issue of second-order freeloading: the exploitation of the efforts of others to uphold incentives for cooperation \[[@CR7], [@CR38], [@CR41], [@CR43], [@CR63]\]. Sasaki et al. \[[@CR50]\] consider incentives controlled exclusively by a centralized authority (like the empire or state) \[[@CR2], [@CR4], [@CR12], [@CR31]\], and thus, their model is already free from the second-order freeloader problem.

Here we analytically provide a full classification of the replicator dynamics in a public good game with institutional incentives and optional participation. We clarify when and how cooperation can be selected over defection in a bi-stable situation associated with institutional punishment without requiring any ability to communicate among individuals. In particular, assuming that the penalties are large enough to cause bi-stability with both full cooperation and full defection (no matter what the basins of attraction are) in cases of compulsory participation, cooperation will necessarily become selected in the long term, regardless of the initial conditions.

The paper is organized as follows. In Sect. [2](#Sec2){ref-type="sec"}, we formalize optional public good games with institutional incentives and determine the average payoffs for the three strategies: cooperation, defection, and non-participation. In Sect. [3](#Sec5){ref-type="sec"}, based on analytical results from compulsory games (Sect. [3.1](#Sec6){ref-type="sec"}), we explore the interior equilibrium (Sect. [3.2](#Sec7){ref-type="sec"}) and in detail classify global dynamics for the three strategies (Sect. [3.3](#Sec8){ref-type="sec"}). Finally, in Sect. [4](#Sec10){ref-type="sec"} we provide further discussion and concluding remarks.

Model {#Sec2}
=====

Social Dilemmas {#Sec3}
---------------

To describe our institutional-incentive model, we start from public good games with group size *n*≥2. The *n* players in a group are given the opportunity to participate in a public good game. We assume that participation pays a fixed entrance fee *σ*\>0 to the sanctioning institution, whereas non-participation yields nothing. We denote by *m* the number of players who are willing to participate (0≤*m*≤*n*) and assume that at least two participants are required for the game to occur \[[@CR9], [@CR13], [@CR24], [@CR26], [@CR55]\]. If the game does take place, each of the *m* participants in the group can decide whether to invest a fixed amount *c*\>0 into a common pool, knowing that each contribution will be multiplied by *r*\>1 and then shared equally among all *m*−1 *other* participants in the group. Thus, participants have no direct gain from their own investments \[[@CR13], [@CR15], [@CR55], [@CR56], [@CR63]\]. If all of the participants invest, they obtain a net payoff (*r*−1)*c*\>0. The game is a social dilemma, which is independent of the value of *r*, because participants can improve their payoffs by withholding their contribution.

Let us next assume that the total incentive stipulated by a sanctioning institution is proportional to the group size *m* and hence of the form *mδ*, where *δ*\>0 is the (potential) per capita incentive. If rewards are employed to incentivize cooperation, these funds will be shared among the so-called "cooperators" who contribute (see \[[@CR48]\] for a voluntary reward fund). Hence, each cooperator will obtain a bonus that is denoted by *mδ*/*n*~C~, where *n*~C~ denotes the number of cooperators in the group of *m* participants. If penalties are employed to incentivize cooperation, "defectors" who do not contribute will analogously have their payoffs reduced by $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$n_{\rm D}$\end{document}$ denotes the number of defectors in the group of *m* participants ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$m =n_{\rm C} +n_{\rm D}$\end{document}$).

We consider an infinitely large and well-mixed population of players, from which *n* samples are randomly selected to form a group for each game. Our analysis of the underlying evolutionary game is based especially on the replicator dynamics \[[@CR30]\] for the three corresponding strategies of the cooperator, defector, and non-participant, with respective frequencies *x*, *y*, and *z*. The combination of all possible values of (*x*,*y*,*z*) with *x*,*y*,*z*≥0 and *x*+*y*+*z*=1 forms the triangular state space *Δ*. We denote by C, D, and N the three vertices of *Δ* that correspond to the three homogeneous states in which all cooperate (*x*=1), defect (*y*=1), or are non-participants (*z*=1), respectively. For *Δ*, the replicator dynamics is defined by $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$s = {\rm o}, {\rm r}, {\rm p}$\end{document}$ is used to specify one of three different incentive schemes, namely, "without incentives," "with rewards," and "with punishment," respectively. Because non-participants have a payoff of 0, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We note that if (*r*−1)*c*\>*σ*, the three edges of the state space *Δ* form a heteroclinic cycle without incentives: N → C → D → N (Figs. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}a or [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}a). Defectors dominate cooperators because of the cost of contribution *c*, and non-participants dominate defectors because of the cost of participation *σ*. Finally, cooperators dominate non-participants because of the net benefit from the public good game with (*r*−1)*c*\>*σ*. In the interior of $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$\rm \varDelta$\end{document}$, all of the trajectories originate from and converge to N, which is a non-hyperbolic equilibrium. Hence, cooperation can emerge only in brief bursts, sparked by random perturbations \[[@CR13], [@CR25]\].

Payoffs {#Sec4}
-------

Here, we calculate the average payoff for the whole population and the expected payoff values for cooperators and defectors. In a group with *m*−1 co-participants (*m*=2,...,*n*), a defector or a cooperator obtains from the public good game an average payoff of *rcx*/(1−*z*) \[[@CR13]\]. Hence, $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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We now turn to the cases with institutional incentives. First, we consider penalties. Because cooperators never receive penalties, we have $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$P_{\rm C}^{\rm p}=P_{\rm C}^{\rm o}$\end{document}$. In a group in which the *m*−1 co-participants include *k* cooperators (and thus, *m*−1−*k* defectors), switching from defecting to cooperating implies avoiding the penalty *mδ*/(*m*−*k*). Hence, $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Next, we consider rewards. It is now the defectors who are unaffected, implying $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Results {#Sec5}
=======

Coordination and Coexistence for Compulsory Participation {#Sec6}
---------------------------------------------------------

We investigated the interplay of institutional incentives and optional participation. As a first step, we considered replicator dynamics along the three edges of the state space *Δ*. On the DN-edge (*x*=0), this dynamics is always D → N because the payoff for non-participating is better than that for defecting by at least the participation fee *σ*, regardless of whether penalties versus rewards are in place. On the NC-edge (*y*=0), it is obvious that if the public good game is too expensive (i.e., if *σ*≥(*r*−1)*c*, under penalties or *σ*≥(*r*−1)*c*+*δ*, under rewards), players will opt for non-participation more than cooperation. Indeed, N becomes a global attractor because $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$\dot{z} > 0$\end{document}$ holds in *Δ*∖{*z*=0}. We do not consider cases further but assume that the dynamics of the NC-edge is always N → C.

On the CD-edge (*z*=0), the dynamics corresponds to compulsory participation, and Eq. ([1](#Equ1){ref-type=""}) reduces to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$P_{\rm C}^{\rm r} - P_{\rm D}^{\rm r}$\end{document}$ strictly decreases, with *x*. The condition under which there exists an interior equilibrium R on the CD-edge is $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ \delta_- < \delta< \delta_+ , \quad\mathrm{with} \ \delta_- = \frac{c}{n} \ \mathrm{and} \ \delta_+ = c . $$\end{document}$$

Next, we summarize the game dynamics for compulsory public good games (Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"}). For such a small *δ* that *δ*\<*δ*~−~, defection is a unique outcome; D is globally stable, and C is unstable. For such a large *δ* that *δ*\>*δ*~+~, cooperation is a unique outcome; C is globally stable, and D is unstable. For the intermediate values of *δ*, cooperation evolves in different ways under penalties versus rewards, as follows. Under penalties (Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"}a), as *δ* crosses the threshold *δ*~−~, C becomes stable, and an unstable interior equilibrium R splits off from C. The point R separates the basins of attraction of C and D. Penalties cause bi-stable competition between cooperators and defectors, which is often exhibited as a coordination game \[[@CR57]\]; one or the other norm will become established, but there can be no coexistence. With increasing *δ*, the basin of attraction of D becomes increasingly smaller, until *δ* attains the value of *δ*~+~. Here, R merges with the formerly stable D, which becomes unstable. Fig. 1Compulsory public good games with institutional incentives. The location of stable and unstable equilibria (*thick continuous lines* and *dashed lines*, respectively) and the direction of evolution (*dotted arrows*) vary, depending on the per capita incentive, *δ*. For very small and sufficiently large values of *δ*, full defection (*x*=0) and full cooperation (*x*=1) are the final outcomes, respectively. This applies to both incentives considered. Intermediate values of *δ* impact evolutionary dynamics in a strikingly different way, as follows. (**a**) Punishment. When *δ* increases beyond a threshold *δ* ~−~, an unstable interior equilibrium R enters the state space at *x*=1, moves left, and eventually exits it at *x*=0 for *δ*=*δ* ~+~. (**b**) Rewards. When *δ* increases beyond a threshold *δ* ~−~, a (globally) stable interior equilibrium R enters the state space at *x*=0, moves right, and eventually exits it at *x*=1 for *δ*=*δ* ~+~. Consequently, for the interval *δ* ~−~\<*δ*\<*δ* ~+~ (*gray-colored region*), punishment results in bi-stability of both pure states; rewards lead to a stable mixture independent of the initial state. Parameters: *n*=5, *r*=3, *c*=1, and *σ*=0.5

In contrast, under rewards (Fig. [1](#Fig1){ref-type="fig"}b), as *δ* crosses a threshold *δ*~−~, D becomes unstable, and a stable interior equilibrium R splits off from D. The point R is a global attractor. Rewards give rise to the stable coexistence of cooperators and defectors, which is a typical result in a snowdrift game \[[@CR58]\]. As *δ* increases, the fraction of cooperators within the stable coexistence becomes increasingly larger. Finally, as *δ* reaches another threshold *δ*~+~, R merges with the formerly unstable C, which becomes stable. We note that both *δ*~+~ and *δ*~−~ do not depend on whether we take into account rewards or penalties.

The Interior Equilibrium Q for Optional Participation {#Sec7}
-----------------------------------------------------

Now, we consider the interior of the state space *Δ*. We start by exploring the fixed point in the interior. For this purpose, we introduce the coordinate system (*f*,*z*) in *Δ*∖{*z*=1}, with *f*=*x*/(*x*+*y*), and we rewrite Eq. ([1](#Equ1){ref-type=""}) as $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ \dot{f}=f(1-f) \bigl(P_{\rm C}^s - P_{\rm D}^s \bigr), \qquad\dot{z}=-z \bar{P}^s. $$\end{document}$$ Dividing the right-hand side of Eq. ([10](#Equ10){ref-type=""}) by 1−*z*^*n*−1^, which is positive in *Δ*∖{*z*=1}, corresponds to a change in velocity and does not affect the orbits in *Δ* \[[@CR30]\]. Using Eqs. ([3](#Equ3){ref-type=""})--([6](#Equ6){ref-type=""}), this transforms Eq. ([10](#Equ10){ref-type=""}) into the following. Under penalties, Eq. ([10](#Equ10){ref-type=""}) becomes $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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When there are only two players (i.e., pairwise interactions with *n*=2), there are either no interior equilibria or else a line of interior equilibria that connects R and N (the latter situation can arise for only one choice of *δ*). A summary of the dynamics for *n*=2 is given in Sect. [3.4](#Sec9){ref-type="sec"}. Here we analyze the general case of a public good game with more than two players (i.e., *n*\>2). Then, if Q exists, it is uniquely determined and a saddle point, whether incentives are penalties or rewards (see Appendices [A.1](#Sec12){ref-type="sec"} and [A.2](#Sec13){ref-type="sec"} for detailed proofs of the uniqueness and the saddle, respectively). As *δ* increases, Q splits off from R (with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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Classification of Global Dynamics {#Sec8}
---------------------------------

Here, we analyze in detail the global dynamics using Eqs. ([11](#Equ11){ref-type=""}) and ([12](#Equ12){ref-type=""}), which are well defined on the entire unit square *U*={(*f*,*z*):0≤*f*≤1,0≤*z*≤1}. The induced mapping, $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}${\rm N}_{1}$\end{document}$, as before. In *Δ*, the separatrix NR and the NC-edge now intersect transversally at N, and the entrance of a minority of participants (including cooperators and defectors) into the greater population of non-participants may be successful.**Rewards**. If $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$\delta_{\rm p}$\end{document}$ (Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}d), the saddle point Q enters the interior of *Δ* through R, which becomes a source. Based on the uniqueness of Q and the Poincaré--Bendixson theorem (\[[@CR30]\], Appendix [A.3](#Sec14){ref-type="sec"}), we can see that there is no such homoclinic orbit originating from and converging to Q, and the unstable manifold of Q must consist of an orbit converging to C and an orbit converging to $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}${\rm N}_{0}$\end{document}$. For *Δ*, this means that the corresponding region is filled with homoclinic orbits and is surrounded by a heteroclinic cycle N → Q → N (Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}d). As *δ* further increases, Q moves across *U*, from the CD-edge to the $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$\delta_{\rm r}$\end{document}$ (Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}d), Q enters the interior of *Δ* through R, which becomes a sink. As *δ* continues to increase, similarly Q moves to the $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$f = f_{\rm Q(r)}$\end{document}$. There is no homoclinic loop for Q, as under penalties, and now, we find that the stable manifold of Q must consist of two orbits originating from D and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$\rm \varDelta$\end{document}$ is filled with homoclinic orbits and is surrounded by a heteroclinic cycle N → Q → N (Figs. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}c and [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}d). If the population is in the vicinity of N, small and rare random perturbations will eventually send the population into the basin of attraction of R (as is the case for $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$\delta^{\rm r}$\end{document}$ under rewards (Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}e), Q exits the state space through S, which then becomes a saddle point. For larger values of *δ*, there is no longer an interior equilibrium.Finally, as *δ* crosses *δ*~+~ (Figs. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}f and [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}f), R and S simultaneously exit *U*, through D and $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$\dot{f} > 0$\end{document}$ holds throughout the state space. All of the interior orbits originate from D and converge to C. Hence, C is globally stable.

Degenerate Dynamics for Pairwise Interactions with *n*=2 {#Sec9}
--------------------------------------------------------

In the specific case when *n*=2, by solving Eqs. ([14](#Equ14){ref-type=""}) and ([15](#Equ15){ref-type=""}) with *H*(*f*,*z*)=1, the dynamics has an interior equilibrium only when $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ \delta=\frac{rc^2}{(r+1)c+\sigma} \ {\rm under} \ {\rm penalties} \ {\rm and} \ \delta= \frac{rc^2}{2rc-\sigma} \ {\rm under} \ {\rm rewards}. $$\end{document}$$ At this moment, throughout both incentives, R and S in *U* undergo bifurcation simultaneously, and the line $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$f = f_{\rm Q}$\end{document}$ given in Eq. ([14](#Equ14){ref-type=""}), which consists of a continuum of equilibria, connects R and S (and in *Δ*, R and N) (Fig. [4](#Fig4){ref-type="fig"}). When *δ* does not take the specific value in Eq. ([25](#Equ25){ref-type=""}), there is no interior equilibrium, and the global dynamics is classified as in the general case when *n*\>2 (see the list 1--3, 5, 6 of Sect. [3.3](#Sec8){ref-type="sec"}). Within pairwise interactions, therefore, the interior dynamics degenerates. This exceptional case was not described in Sasaki et al. \[[@CR50]\]. Fig. 4Degenerate interior dynamics for *n*=2. Notations are as in Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}, and the stream plot is given under (**a**) penalties based on Eq. ([11](#Equ11){ref-type=""}) and (**b**) rewards based on Eq. ([12](#Equ12){ref-type=""}) with a specific *δ* in Eq. ([25](#Equ25){ref-type=""}). For *n*=2, only when *δ* takes the specific value, the state space has an interior equilibrium, which is a linear continuum of the equilibria. (**a**) Under penalties, the fixed-point line that connects N (S in *U*) and R is repelling and divides *Δ* into basins of attraction of N ($\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}${\rm N}_{0}$\end{document}$ in *U*) and C. From the vicinity of N, arbitrarily small random perturbations will send the state into the region of attraction of C. (**b**) Under rewards, the fixed-point line is attracting, and thus, the interior orbits converge to corresponding points on the line. Other parameters include *c*=1, *σ*=0.5, and *r*=3 (**a**) or 1 (**b**), which leads to that the degeneracy arises at *δ*=2/3 for penalties as well as for rewards

Discussion {#Sec10}
==========

We considered a model for the evolution of cooperation through institutional incentives and analyzed in detail the evolutionary game dynamics. We employed public goods games, which typically assume that there are at least three players. Specifically, based on a public good game with optional participation, we fully analyzed how opting-out impacts on game dynamics; in particular, opting-out can completely overcome a coordination problem associated with punishment for a considerably broader range of parameters than in cases of compulsory participation.

We start from assuming that there is a state-like institution that takes exclusive control of individual-level sanctions in the form of penalties and rewards. In our extended model, nobody is forced to enter a joint enterprise that is protected by the institutional sanctioning. However, whoever is willing to enter, must be charged at the entrance. Further, if one proves unable or unwilling to pay, the sanctioning institution can ban that person from participation in the game. Indeed, joint ventures in real life are mostly protected by enforceable contracts in which members can freely participate, but are then bound by a higher authority. For example, anyone can opt to not participate in a wedding vow, but once it is taken, it is among the strongest enforceable contracts. As far as we know, higher authorities always demand penalties if contracts are broken.

Based on our mathematical analysis, we argue that institutional punishment, rather than institutional rewards, can become a more viable incentivization scheme for cooperation when combined with optional participation. In spite of the fact that the expected payoffs include nonlinear terms, the corresponding replicator dynamics is completely analyzed: in particular, proving that the interior equilibrium for optional participation is unique and a saddle point plays a key role in solving the global dynamics.

We show that combining optional participation with rewards can only marginally improve group welfare (to the same level as the non-participant's fixed payoff) for a small range of the per capita incentive *δ*, with $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$\delta_{-} < \delta< \delta_{\rm r}$\end{document}$ (Fig. [3](#Fig3){ref-type="fig"}b). Within this interval, compulsory participation can lead to partial cooperation; however, optional participation eliminates the cooperation and thus drives a population into a state in which all players exit. Hence, freedom of participation is not a particularly effective way of boosting cooperation under a rewards scenario.

Under penalties, the situation changes considerably. Indeed, as soon as *δ*\>*δ*~−~ (Fig. [2](#Fig2){ref-type="fig"}b), the state in which all players cooperate abruptly turns into a global attractor for optional participation. When *δ* just exceeds *δ*~−~, group welfare becomes the maximum (*r*−1)*c*−*σ*. Meanwhile, for compulsory participation, a largest part of the (boundary) state space between cooperation and defection still belongs to the basin of attraction of the state in which all players defect. Because *δ*~−~=*c*/*n*, where *n* is the group size, and *c* is the net contribution cost (a constant), when *n* is larger, the minimal sanctioning cost *δ*~−~ to establish full cooperation is smaller.

Collaborating results for compulsory participation have recently been obtained in continuous public good games with institutional incentives by Cressman et al. \[[@CR12]\], who considered the gradual evolution of continuously varying contribution to a public good. The authors show that rewarding and punishing with probabilities depending on the player's contribution and those of the co-players, can destabilize full defection and stabilize full cooperation, respectively. This model also indicates that combining the best of both incentives would lead the population to full cooperation, irrespective of the initial condition. Looking back at our model, non-participation reflects the common characteristic of destabilizing full defection; thus, it would be fascinating to investigate how efficiently voluntary rewards \[[@CR28], [@CR48], [@CR54]\], instead of voluntary participation, can establish coercion-based cooperation.

In the next two paragraphs, we consider only the penalty scenario and the corresponding coordination situation. There are various approaches to equilibrium selection in *n*-person coordination games for binary choices \[[@CR19], [@CR29], [@CR34]\]. A strand of literature uses stochastic evolution models \[[@CR14], [@CR33], [@CR64]\], in which typically, a risk-dominant equilibrium \[[@CR23]\] that has the larger basin of attraction is selected through random fluctuation in the long run. In contrast, considering optional participation, our model typically selects the cooperation equilibrium which provides the higher group welfare, even if the cooperation equilibrium has the smaller basin of attraction when participation is compulsory than has the defection equilibrium. In the sense of favoring the efficient equilibrium, our result is similar to that found in a decentralized partner-changing model proposed by Oechssler \[[@CR36]\], in which players may occasionally change interaction groups.

Higher-order freeloaders are problematic for decentralized peer-to-peer sanctions \[[@CR11], [@CR41]\]. This is not the case, however, for centralized institutional sanctions. In addition, it is clear that sanctioning institutions will stipulate a lesser antisocial punishment targeted at cooperators \[[@CR27]\], which can prevent the evolution of pro-social behaviors (\[[@CR44], [@CR46]\], see also \[[@CR18]\]). Indeed, punishing cooperators essentially promotes defectors, who will reduce the number of participants willing to pay for social institutions. For self-sustainability, thus, sanctioning institutions should dismiss any antisocial schemes that may lead to a future reduction in resources for funding the institution.

Thus, we find that our model restricts the space of possible actions into a very narrow framework of alternative strategies, while increasing complexity. In practice, truly chaotic situations which offer a very long list of possibilities are unfeasible and create inconvenience, as is described by Michael Ende in "*The Prison of Freedom*" \[1992\]. Participants in economic experiments usually can make their meaningful choices only from a short and regulated list of options, as is the way in real life. Our result indicates that a third party capable of controlling incentives and membership can play a key role in selecting a cooperation equilibrium without ex ante adjustment. The question of how such a social order can emerge out of a world of chaos is left entirely open.

Appendix {#Sec11}
========

A.1 Uniqueness of the Interior Equilibrium Q {#Sec12}
--------------------------------------------
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                \begin{document}$z_{\rm Q}$\end{document}$ is uniquely determined in the general case for *n*\>2. Both equations in Eq. ([15](#Equ15){ref-type=""}) have at most one solution with respect to *z*. Because $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$z_{\rm Q}$\end{document}$, it is sufficient to show that *H*(*f*,*z*) is strictly monotonic for every *z*∈(0,1). We first consider penalties. A straightforward computation yields $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document} $$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial}{\partial z} H(f,z) &= \frac{n-1}{(1-f)(1-z^{n-1})^2} \bigl[z^{n-2} - \bigl(f+(1-f)z\bigr)^{n-2} \bigl((1-f)+fz^{n-2}\bigr)\bigr] \\ &= \frac{(n-1) z^{n-2}}{(1-f)(1-z^{n-1})^2} \\ &\quad {} \times \biggl[ 1- \biggl\{ \biggl( \frac{f+(1-f)z}{z} \biggr) \bigl((1-f)+fz \bigr) \biggr\}^{n-2} \frac{(1-f)+fz^{n-2}}{((1-f)+fz)^{n-2}} \biggr]. \end{aligned}$$ \end{document}$$ We note that $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ \biggl( \frac{f+(1-f)z}{z} \biggr) \bigl((1-f)+fz\bigr) = 1+f(1-f) \biggl( z-2+ \frac{1}{z} \biggr) = 1+f(1-f)\frac{(1-z)^2}{z} > 1, $$\end{document}$$ and $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ \frac{(1-f)+fz^{n-2}}{((1-f)+fz)^{n-2}} \ge1. $$\end{document}$$ This inequality obviously holds for *n*=2. By induction for every larger *n*, if it holds for *n*, it must hold for *n*+1 because $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ \frac{(1-f)+fz^{n+1}}{((1-f)+fz)^{n+1}} - \frac{(1-f)+fz^{n}}{((1-f)+fz)^{n}} = \frac{f(1-f)(1-z)(1-z^n)}{((1-f)+fz)^{n+1}} > 0. $$\end{document}$$ Consequently, the square bracketed term in the last line of Eq. ([26](#Equ26){ref-type=""}) is negative. Thus, *∂H*(*f*,*z*)/*∂z*\<0 for every *z*∈(0,1). We now consider rewards and use the same argument as above. This concludes our proof of the uniqueness of Q.

A.2 The Saddle Point Q {#Sec13}
----------------------

We prove that for *n*\>2, Q is a saddle point. We first consider penalties using Eq. ([11](#Equ11){ref-type=""}). Because the square brackets in Eq. ([11](#Equ11){ref-type=""}) vanish at Q, the Jacobian at Q is given by $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \begin{document}$$ J_{\rm Q} = \left.\begin{pmatrix} \delta f(1-f) ( H + f \frac{\partial H}{\partial f} ) & \delta f^2 (1-f) \frac{\partial H}{\partial z}\\ z(1-z) [ -A+\delta ( (1-2f)H+f(1-f) \frac {\partial H}{\partial f} ) ] & \delta f(1-f)z(1-z) \frac{\partial H}{\partial z} \end{pmatrix} \right\rvert _{\rm Q}, $$\end{document}$$ where *H*=*H*(*f*,*z*) and *A*=(*r*−1)*c*+*δ*. Using *∂H*(*f*,*z*)/*∂z*\<0, *H*\>0, and *A*\>0, which yields $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
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                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$ \mathrm{det} \, J_{\rm Q} = \delta f^2 (1-f)z(1-z) \bigl[A + \delta f H(f,z)\bigr] \frac{\partial H(f,z)}{\partial z} < 0. $$\end{document}$$ Therefore, Q is a saddle point.

We next consider rewards using Eq. ([12](#Equ12){ref-type=""}). Similarly, we find that the Jacobian at Q is given by $$\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$$ J_{\rm Q} = \left.\begin{pmatrix} \delta f(1-f) ( -H + (1-f) \frac{\partial H}{\partial f} ) & \delta f (1-f)^2 \frac{\partial H}{\partial z} \\ -z(1-z) [ A+\delta ( (1-2f)H+f(1-f) \frac {\partial H}{\partial f} ) ] & \delta-f(1-f)z(1-z) \frac{\partial H}{\partial z} \end{pmatrix} \right \vert _{\rm Q}, $$\end{document}$$ where *H*=*H*(1−*f*,*z*) and *A* is as in Eq. ([30](#Equ30){ref-type=""}). Using *∂H*(1−*f*,*z*)/*∂z*\<0, *H*\>0, and *A*\>0, it follows again that $\documentclass[12pt]{minimal}
                \usepackage{amsmath}
                \usepackage{wasysym} 
                \usepackage{amsfonts} 
                \usepackage{amssymb} 
                \usepackage{amsbsy}
                \usepackage{mathrsfs}
                \usepackage{upgreek}
                \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt}
                \begin{document}$\mathrm{det} \, J_{\rm Q} < 0$\end{document}$. Therefore, Q is a saddle point.

A.3 No Homoclinic Orbit of Q {#Sec14}
----------------------------

First, we prove that a homoclinic loop that originates from and converges to Q does not exist. Using the Poincaré--Bendixson theorem \[[@CR30]\] and the uniqueness of an interior equilibrium, we show that if it does exist, there must be a point *p* inside the loop such that both of its *α*- and *ω*-limit sets include Q. This contradicts the fact that Q is a saddle point. Indeed, there may be a section that cuts through Q such that the positive and negative orbits of *p* infinitely often cross it; however, it is impossible for a sequence consisting of all the crossing points to originate from and also converge to the saddle point Q. Hence, there is no homoclinic orbit of Q.

Next, we show that orbits that form the unstable manifold of Q do not converge to the same equilibrium (indeed, this is a sink). If they do, the closed region that is surrounded by the orbits must include a point *q* such that its *ω*-limit set is Q. Using the Poincaré--Bendixson theorem and the uniqueness of an interior equilibrium, the *α*-limit set for *q* must include Q; this is a contradiction. Similarly, we can prove that the orbits that form the stable manifold of Q do not issue from the same equilibrium.
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